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Abstract. I reconstruct Adam Smith’s theory of irony and its application. I illustrate how he defines it as a combination 
of something “grand” with something “mean” and how this is consistent with his anti-Cartesian and post-sceptic 
epistemology. I suggest that, for Smith, “systems” of any kind, from Cartesian physics to philosophical monotheism, 
Stoic ethics, and the “mercantile system” draw their apparent plausibility from some disease of human imagination. I 
argue that in every field, including political economy, in his view, the philosopher’s task is partially sceptical and partially 
ironical. That is, it is the task to fight erroneous systems by showing how these arise from unwarranted associations of 
ideas between apparently “grand” ideas —say, the public interest— with “mean” ones, say, the merchants’ self-interest. 
In this light, the phrase “invisible hand” turns out to be both an ironic joke and one more application of Smith’s post-
sceptical theory of knowledge whose target is dismantling all kind of “invisible” entities that human imagination tends 
to create.
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[es] La ironía de Adam Smith y la mano invisible
Resumen. Describo la teoría de la ironía de Adam Smith y su aplicación. Explico su definición como una combinación de 
algo “grandioso” con algo “mezquino” y cómo esta es coherente con su epistemología anti-cartesiana y post-escéptica. 
Sugiero que, según Smith, la aparente plausibilidad de los sistemas de cualquier tipo, desde la física cartesiana hasta el 
monoteísmo filosófico, la ética estoica y el “sistema mercantil”, es el resultado de alguna enfermedad de la imaginación 
humana. Sostengo que, en su opinión, la tarea del filósofo en todos los ámbitos, incluyendo la economía política, es 
parcialmente escéptica y parcialmente irónica. Es decir, luchar contra los sistemas erróneos, mostrando cómo éstos 
surgen de asociaciones injustificadas entre ideas aparentemente “grandiosas” —digamos, el interés público— con 
ideas “mezquinas”, por ejemplo el interés egoísta de los comerciantes. En este sentido, el uso de la expresión “mano 
invisible” resulta ser irónico y, al mismo tiempo, una aplicación de su propia teoría post-escéptica del conocimiento 
que plantea el objectivo de desmantelar todo tipo de entidades “invisibles” que la imaginación humana tiende a crear.
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espontáneo.
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ARTÍCULOS
1. Introduction: Adam Smith’s irony
My claim is that Adam Smith’s mention of 
the invisible hand was neither a reference to 
a still non-existing theory of self-regulating 
markets nor just a “mildly ironic joke”; it is 
true that he contributed two key ideas in social 
thought, namely the unintended-results princi-
ple and the doctrine of spontaneous emergence 
of order, but neither may be identified with an 
elusive “invisible-hand principle”. The phrase 
had been adopted in the twentieth century as 
a label for both doctrines, and this would not 
be too bad. What is confusing, yet, is that the 
distinction between two distinct principles has 
been blurred and that the —in itself innocu-
ous— linguistic innovation has been read ret-
rospectively in Smith’s work. 
I proceed as follows: I locate, first, Adam 
Smith’s theory of irony against the background 
of the Renaissance discussion on the nature of 
laughter and the following discussion of its 
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usefulness and dangers, and accordingly of the 
function of irony (sect. 2); I discuss the rela-
tionship between Smith’s theory and practice 
of irony and his anti-Cartesian epistemolo-
gy (sects. 3-4); I examine three applications, 
namely his discussion of suicide (sect. 5), 
his critique of the mercantilist definition of 
wealth (sect. 6), and his idea of “invisible hand” 
in (sects. 7-8); I sketch a viable reading of the 
phrase “invisible hand” by singling out its se-
mantic and pragmatic dimensions (sect. 9); 
and I conclude that in recent literature poor 
Adam Smith has been, once more, praised or 
attacked not for what he wanted to say but pre-
cisely for what he wanted to deny.
2. The fifteenth-century rediscovery of laughter
After medieval reticence vis-à-vis laughter, a 
tradition of discourse on its nature and func-
tion started in fifteenth-century Italy and went 
on expanding, with its peak in eighteenth-cen-
tury Britain. Apart from a few lines in Aristot-
le’s De partibus animalium, humanist schol-
ars had little to start with, and they resorted 
to combining observations by physicians with 
traveller’s reports and moralists’ and divines’ 
scattered remarks. The topics discussed were 
the biological basis of laughter and its possible 
function as an alternative to both melancholy 
and enthusiasm (Ménager 1995, 7-41), its dis-
tinction from derision, and cases in which it is 
a mark of one’s own weakness (Hobbes 1651, 
43; cf. Skinner 2002: 175-176). A consensus 
was reached on the claim that it is more than 
a passion like others and that it was the effect 
of a combination of ambivalent sentiments 
(Ménager 1995, 41). Within the discussion of 
literary devices admissible in order to provoke 
laughter, they rescued Irony. It was understood, 
more than as a technique, as a basic element 
of the new Poetic, with the Don Quijote as a 
paradigmatic example. Before the Greek term 
ειρωνεία was rediscovered by the Romantics, 
its substance went under different names, in 
Britain “Wit”, a term with the same root of the 
German Witz but a different connotation, one 
close to that of Baltasar Gracián’s “agudeza”, 
connoting a brilliant character, intelligence, 
common sense, and a sense of humour, a more 
down-to-earth attitude, both scholarly and bril-
liant, but in an intellectual, not imaginative or 
sentimental sense (Weinrich 1976, 579). The 
connotation of Witz was instead “ironic” in a 
Romantic sense, alluding to the fantastic, the 
burlesque and the poetical as paths leading to 
the Universal. 
The Earl of Shaftesbury, in the “Letter on En-
thusiasm”, undertook a vindication of laughter’s 
civilizing effect. He claimed that, in order to have 
an “impartial and free censure of manners as one 
would expect to meet in a free country”, we need 
that no peculiar custom or opinion be set apart 
and exempted from criticism, not even those that 
we are prone to believe to be the proper occa-
sion for display of a serious attitude. In fact, in 
order to find whether a thing is truly serious or 
is instead ridiculous, the only way is “applying 
the ridicule” to it, in order “to see whether it will 
bear” (Shaftesbury 1708 II.11). And, in order to 
illustrate the function of “ridicule”, he draws a 
kind of iatro-psycho-political analogy. He sug-
gests that there are “certain humours in mankind 
which of necessity must have vent […] So in rea-
son, too, there are heterogeneous particles which 
must be thrown off by fermentation”(Shaftesbury 
1708 II.12). One would be a bad physician if he 
tried to eliminate them suddenly from the body 
of his patient and politicians who tried to do the 
same with enthusiasm and superstition would be 
“as ill physicians in the body-politic” (Ibid.). The 
magistrate should instead enter by “sympathy” 
into the concerns of the people and should sooth 
their passions and heal the people “by cheerful 
ways”. In ancient times —he adds— against en-
thusiasm and superstition, the “Epicurean and the 
Academic sects were allowed to use all the force 
of wit and raillery” (Shaftesbury 1708 II.14-15).
In “Sensus Communis” he adds that free 
laughter is the mark and the precondition of 
freedom. He writes that all “Politeness is ow-
ing to Liberty. We polish one another, and rub 
off our Corners and rough Sides by a sort of 
amicable Collision” (Shaftesbury 1709 I.ii). 
There may be, yet, better and worse sorts of 
wit, and the best ones flourish only when not 
artificially bridled, “wit of a most refined sort 
is what is becoming to a free people, while buf-
foonery is the specialty of a people of slaves” 
(Ibid. I.iv), and the proof is the fact that Ital-
ians are the best kind of buffoons. 
Civilized conversation is a friend of para-
dox, scepticism and pessimism about human 
nature. This is not truly destructive since the 
reason why Men of Wit
 delight so much to expose these paradoxi-
cal Systems, is not in truth that they are so 
fully satisfy’d with “em; but in a view the 
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better to oppose some other Systems, which 
by their fair Appearance have help’d, they 
think, to bring Mankind under Subjection. 
They imagine that by this general Scepti-
cism, which they wou’d introduce they 
shall better deal with the dogmatical Spirit 
which prevails (Ibid. II.ii).
The real danger is hypocrisy, since “virtue 
is never such a sufferer by being contested, as 
by being betray’d” (Ibid. II.iii). And he recom-
mends
 to learn to temper and regulate that Humour 
which nature has given us, as a more len-
itive Remedy against Vice, and a kind of 
Specifick against Superstition and Melan-
choly Delusion. There is a great difference 
between seeking how to arise a Laugh from 
every thing and seeking, in every thing, 
what justly may be laughed at (Ibid, IV.i). 
John Brown, the author of a systematic crit-
icism of his ideas, contended that ridicule or 
raillery is utterly different from wit. The lat-
ter is a sort of poetry resulting from “sudden 
assemblages and pleasing pictures of things” 
(Brown 1751, 42). The former is “that species 
of writing which excites contempt with Laugh-
ter [and] solely regards the Opinions, Passions, 
Actions, and Characters of Men” (Ibid.). Al-
though working with similar mechanisms, 
when applied to the “end of Persuasion” (Ibid.) 
it becomes something almost opposite to wit, 
namely, “no other than a Species of Eloquence. 
It has no other Source than Imagination, Pas-
sions, Prejudice, and preconceived Opinion: 
And therefore can never be the Detector of 
Falsehood, or Test of Truth” (Ibid.). 
Francis Hutcheson, in his “Reflections on 
Laughter” set out to examine “the effects of 
Laughter and the ends for which it was im-
planted in our Nature” (Hutcheson 1725, 120). 
As regards its effects, it is necessarily pleasant 
and since it is very contagious, it is an easy 
remedy for discontent and sorrow; as a conse-
quence, we are disposed to a good opinion of 
the person who provokes it. Besides, it cannot 
be used as a weapon against anything that may 
be really valuable, for,
 if an object, action or event be truly great 
in every respect, it will have no natural re-
lation or resemblance to anything mean or 
base; and consequently, no mean Idea can 
be joined to it with any natural Resem-
blance (Hutcheson 1725, 121-122). 
It may be used as a means of correction of 
what is defective in institutions or characters; 
when we face a mixture of “what is truly great 
along with something weak or mean” (Hutch-
eson 1725, 123), ridicule will have “no other 
Effect, but to separate what is great from what 
is not so” (Ibid.). Thus, it is a remedy against 
both enthusiasm and fear, two passions pav-
ing the way to both civil factions and despotic 
governments. When
 any Object either good or evil is aggravat-
ed and increased by the Violence of our 
Passions, or an Enthusiastick Admiration, 
or Fear, the Application of Ridicule is the 
readiest way to bring down our high Imagi-
nations to a Conformity to the real Momen-
tum or Importance of the Affair (Hutcheson 
1725, 123).
To sum up, for both Shaftesbury and Hutch-
eson, ridicule is a basic component of a healthy 
and free state of mind. It is a remedy against 
evils carried by the “splenetic spirit” dominat-
ing the medieval mind and “enthusiasm” fos-
tered by early Reformation. A sense of Ridicule 
properly understood is the mark of the new, 
more reasonable, age. 
One might wonder how much the echo of 
this discussion was still felt in Hume. An echo 
may be in his idea that errors and misdirected 
passions are a major danger and “superstition” 
their most threatening offspring; besides, that 
philosophy is itself a kind of medical treat-
ment, since true doctrines can excite only 
“mild and moderate sentiments”, and false and 
extravagant ones are harmless, in a word, “the 
errors in religion are dangerous; those in phi-
losophy only ridiculous” (Hume 1739-1740 
book I conclu). 
3. Adam Smith’s rhetoric and irony
Adam Smith “was evidently interested in irony 
as a literary form” (Rothschild 2002, 130), and 
it is noteworthy that in the “Review of John-
son’s Dictionary” he chooses the latter’s defi-
nition of HUMOUR as a case study (Johnson 
1755 entry: Humour). After referring to the 
etymology and its reference to bodily fluids, 
Johnson explains that a man who is often in a 
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cheerful mood is called a good humoured man, 
and adds:
 Humour is often made use of to express the 
quality of the imagination which bears a 
considerable resemblance to wit.
 Wit expresses something that is no more 
designed, concerted, regular, and artificial; 
humour, something which comes upon a 
man by fits, which he can neither command 
nor restrain, and which is not perfectly con-
sistent with true politeness, Humour, it has 
been said, is often more diverting than wit; 
yet a man of wit is as much above a man of 
humor, as a gentleman is above a buffoon 
(Smith 1755-1756, 240-241).
The Dictionary includes also an entry for 
Irony, defined as “a mode of speech in which the 
meaning is contrary to the words’, and another 
for “ironically”, where the example of Socrates 
is offered, rejecting the oracle of Delphi’s qual-
ification as the wisest man of Greece by say-
ing that the only trait characterizing himself 
as wise was “that he was not wise, and knew 
it and others were not wise, and knew it not” 
(Johnson 1755 entry: Ironically). There is also 
an entry for “ridicule”, defined as “Wit of that 
species that provokes laughter”, but no entry 
for “Comic”, apparently identified with “Ridi-
cule”. There is one for “Wit”, defined as “Im-
agination; quickness of fancy”, where Locke is 
quoted when contrasting Wit with judgement, 
the latter being the art of “separating careful-
ly one from another ideas” and the former the 
art of assembling ideas, “putting those togeth-
er with quickness and variety, wherein can be 
found any resemblance, or congruity, thereby to 
make up pleasant pictures in the fancy” (Locke 
1699 i.2.2).
Apparently also Smith did not mention 
irony as such in his Lectures on Rhetoric but 
treated Wit at considerable length, following 
Johnson and Hutcheson. Ridicule consists in 
an association of the grand and the mean, the
 foundation of Ridicule is either when what 
is in most respects Grand ore pretends to 
be so or is expected to be so, has some-
thing mean or little in it or when we find 
something that is really mean with some 
pretensions and marks of grandeur […] If 
we represent an object which we are apt to 
conceive as a grand one or as of no dignity, 
and turn its qualities into the contrary, the 
mixture of the ideas excites our laughter 
tho neither of them separately would do so 
(Smith 1982 i.107-108).
In more detail, the objects of ridicule are 
“either those which, affecting to be Grand or 
being expected to be so, are mean, or being 
Grand in some of their parts are mean in oth-
ers” (Smith 1982 v.116). That is, the only
 species of Ridicule which is true and gen-
uine wit is that where Real foibles and 
blemishes in the Characters or behaviour of 
men are exposed to our view in a ridiculous 
light. This is altogether consistent with the 
character of a Gentleman as it tends to the 
reformation of manners and the benefit of 
mankind” (Ibid.).
Smith believes that rhetoric is grounded 
in sympathetic mechanisms. Lecture 11 starts 
with the remark that the conveying to a hear-
er of “the sentiment, passion or affection with 
which [his thought] affects him” —“the per-
fection of style”— is regulated by a “Rule, 
which is equally applicable to conversation 
and behaviour as writing”, and this, like “all 
the Rules of Criticism and morality when 
traced back to their foundation, turn out to 
be some Principles of Common Sence which 
every one assents to” (Ibid., i.133). The prin-
ciple is the one upon which also the theory of 
moral sentiments rests, namely that to approve 
of another’s passions as proper is the same as 
“to observe that we entirely sympathize with 
them” (Smith 1759 I.i.3.1). When applied to 
the sense of ridicule it implies that he “who 
laughs at the same joke […] cannot well deny 
the propriety of my laughter” (Ibid.).
4. Adam Smith’s post-scepticism 
At this stage, the reader may ask, do Smith’s 
views on irony have any connection with his 
system of ideas or is their relevance limited to 
his rhetoric, a field about which he lectured but 
never was the subject of one of the works he 
planned? I will argue that they do, and indeed 
his peculiar philosophy, a third way between 
Phyrronism and dogmatism, gives irony pride 
of place within philosophical argument. It goes 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the 
structure of Smith’s system of ideas, his rela-
tionship to Hume’s philosophy, his opposition 
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to Cartesianism and other kinds of rational-
ism, and his selective use of ancient schools 
of philosophy. I will have to sketch a general 
interpretation referring to literature where it is 
given flesh and bones.
A well-known element from Smith’s biog-
raphy is his friendship with Hume, and the epi-
sodes that, as a student at Balliol College, being 
discovered while reading one of his work won 
him a reprimand, that he entrusted publication 
of his “Principles” to Hume and that Hume 
would have liked to entrust publication of his 
own Dialogues to Smith, that Smith’s account 
of his allegedly atheist friend’s peaceful death 
earned him a great deal of abuse. A respectable 
interpretation of Smith’s philosophy has been 
the one according to which he was basically 
Hume’s follower (Raphael 1977; Macfie and 
Raphael 1976) and a proponent of the latter’s 
common-sense doctrine. Yet, more recent liter-
ature has made the picture more nuanced. It is 
true that, no less than for Hume, knowledge is 
for Smith basically association of ideas. Hume 
“had put forward a theory of the imagination 
which Smith developed as the core of his own 
theory of the mind” (Haakonnsen 2006, 9), and 
for both, “the imagination is a mental faculty 
by means of which people create a distinctive-
ly human sphere within the natural world. It is 
the imagination that enables us to make con-
nections between the perceived elements of 
both the physical and the moral world” (Ibid., 
10). Yet, Smith elaborated on Hume’s ideas, 
basically in a direction that grants the mind a 
more active role. He may be assumed to have 
rejected Phyrronism while endorsing “true 
scepticism” (Hume 1748 xii.3), but he was 
aware of its inherent limits, that its function 
never goes beyond that of a dialectical coun-
terweight to dogmatism. He further improved 
on Hume’s solution centred on the primacy of 
common sense, while trying to find solutions 
for what he felt to be Hume’s main open ques-
tion, and instead of accepting it as the ultimate 
ground, he tried to make room for its capacity 
of self-correction2. Thus, going one step be-
yond Hume, he stressed the constructive side 
of true scepticism, consistently defending in 
every field —ranging from epistemology to 
theology, ethics, politics and political econo-
my— some kind of sceptical something; with-
out being a sceptic, he was a sceptical New-
tonian, a sceptical virtue theorist, a sceptical 
2 Cf. Hanley 2010, 199-202.
Whig, and a sceptical political economist3. The 
defence he provides for his own third way be-
tween dogmatism and Phyrronism lies in the 
proof that “systems” such as philosophical 
monotheism, the Cartesian theory of vortices, 
or the mercantile system, always result from 
oversimplification, excessive love of analo-
gy, confusion of invisible imaginary entities 
with hidden really existent entities. This goes 
with a constant reminder that Phyrronianism 
is self-defeating in so far as it ends up with 
conclusions coincident with those of dogmatic 
systems and vice versa. His intellectual strate-
gy may be properly understood once one keeps 
in mind that he was addressing systematically 
Smith is discussing epistemological, not onto-
logical issues, he never discusses reasons for 
the existence of God or the truth of the New-
tonian system, but focuses instead the mental 
mechanisms on which acceptance of such be-
liefs depend. His intellectual strategy is a di-
alectical one, aiming to unmask false claims 
embedded in those “systems” which succeed 
in imposing themselves to our imagination by 
the apparent “grandness” of their principles 
as contrasted with the “meanness” of reasons 
supporting belief in ambitious but unwarranted 
systems4.
Thus he constantly employed Humean ar-
guments to limit and amend Hume’s own pos-
itive conclusions in as disparate fields as the 
history of science, the theory of justice, natural 
religion, and sympathy5. This applies to both 
theoretical and practical knowledge. In the for-
mer field, the mind’s active role makes room 
for construction of invisible chains or imagi-
nary machines filling in the gaps felt by our 
imagination in our classification of phenome-
na. Besides, it is true that theories are imag-
inary constructs, but there are more and less 
plausible kinds of doctrines, and our imagina-
tion feels compelled to conform with the most 
plausible ones, since they are simpler, more 
consistent, beautiful, and leave less gaps in the 
phenomena. The kind of “third way” he was 
trying to mark out was a more sophisticated 
version of an intellectual program current in 
eighteenth-century Scotland, the “Newtoni-
an philosophy” (Cremaschi 2009, 86-88). In 
3 Forbes 1976; Cremaschi 1989, 85-87; for an opposite view 
see Griswold 1999, 164.
4 See Cremaschi 1989, 85-87; 2000, 73-77; Pack 1996, 185-
189.
5 Cf. Vivenza 1999a; 2001, 2-7, 206-207; Pack and Schliesser 
2006; Fleischacker 2017, sect. 3; Broadie 2013, sect. 9.
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epistemology, the final outcome is the same 
as the one the rationalists wanted to attain, 
that is, an account of natural philosophy ac-
cording to which it is true that there is growth 
of knowledge, theories become simpler and 
more comprehensive, previously incompre-
hensible phenomena are accounted for, and 
accurate predictions become available for still 
non-observed phenomena, but also one whose 
curious point is that the hidden mechanism of 
the human mind allowing for a quasi-realist 
outcome are precisely those cherished by the 
sceptics, namely custom, association of ideas, 
imagination, and self-deception (Cremaschi 
1989, 85-87). This yields, in the “Principles”, 
the paradox that even Newton’s theory may be 
accounted for in terms of psychological mech-
anisms and its ability to impose itself on our 
imagination depends on reasons different from 
truth, and yet the power of imagination is so 
strong that —Smith admits—
 even we, while we have been endeavouring 
to represent all philosophical systems as 
mere inventions of the imagination, to con-
nect together the otherwise disjointed and 
discordant phaenomena of nature, have in-
sensibly been drawn in, to make use of lan-
guage expressing the connecting principles 
of this one, as if they were the real chains 
which Nature makes use of to bind togeth-
er her several operations. Can we wonder 
then, that it […] should now be considered, 
not as an attempt to connect in the imagina-
tion the phaenomena of the Heavens, but as 
the greatest discovery that ever was made 
by man, the discovery of an immense chain 
of the most important and sublime truths, 
all closely connected together, by one cap-
ital fact (Smith 1795, Astronomy IV.76 my 
emphasis).
Note that he contrasts here invention and the 
imaginary on the one hand with the real, fact, 
experience, truth on the other, qualifying the 
latter as important, capital, immense, sublime, 
while adding that self-deception (that is, being 
insensibly been drawn in) works in favour of 
the arguably real, not of the imaginary. All this 
is less than a sceptical conclusion. Note also 
that in the correspondence Smith manifests his 
own doubts about the essay’s worth, and his 
feeling that there was in it “more refinement 
than solidity” (Smith 1987, 168). In a word, 
he believed he had discovered a North-West 
passage and yet was not too confident about 
its navigability, or he had it clear in mind that 
“the genuine difficulty with the sceptical hy-
pothesis lies in its potential for self-reference” 
(Harrison 2011a, 48). Far from an epistemo-
logical realist, he was an epistemological scep-
tic on principle, but the scope of his scepticism 
was confined to that of a counterbalance to the 
temptations of the esprit de système6.
In the other domain, practical knowledge, 
the mind goes beyond the somewhat passive at-
titude admitted of by Hume’s quasi contagion 
view of sympathy. The mind, in Smith’s view, 
mirrors herself in other minds and, instead of 
being influenced by attitudes and emotions 
prevailing there, constructs a triangular rela-
tionship between self, other, and an imaginary 
entity created by the mirroring process, the 
impartial spectator (Fleischacker 2012). Thus, 
he goes beyond Hume’s “sentimentalism” —a 
theory according to which moral judgments 
are a matter of feeling, not or reason, and feel-
ing is an the last ground on which such judge-
ments rest— toward a spectatorial theory, an 
“analysis of the principles, by which men natu-
rally judge concerning the conduct and charac-
ter, first of their neighbours, and afterwards of 
themselves” (Smith 1774, title words). Smith-
ian “sympathy”, rather than emotional conta-
gion, is a complex activity of the imagination 
resulting in “change of situations” (Smith 
1759 I.I.iv.2). This is a constructive process by 
which the human mind produces and refines 
judgements mirroring other minds, thus coop-
erating in the construction of systems of rules. 
Thus, unlike ancient ethical systems, Smithian 
ethics is not virtue ethics but rule-based ethics 
since its origin is essentially social, and vir-
tue ethics comes after, as an illustration of the 
path though which the individual may learn 
the way to appropriate the patterns of action 
established though the above process of social 
interaction7. And in practical philosophy, no 
less than in epistemology, Smith, with all his 
debt to Hume, is on balance closer to Kant. A 
rather obvious reason for such closeness, that 
has been indeed pointed out by several com-
mentators, is that both Kant and Smith are 
post-sceptical thinkers, and their philosophy 
is basically critical philosophy, asking basical-
ly epistemological, not ontological questions, 
6 Cremaschi 2009, 88- 93; see also Hanley 2010; for the 
opposite view see Griswold 1999, 159-171.
7 For the opposite view see McCloskey 2008.
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and their paths of inquiry are parallel because 
both had been awaken from dogmatic slumber 
precisely by Hume. 
In the light of this conclusion, several prob-
lems discussed by Smith scholars loose much 
of their apparent importance, first among them 
—as I discuss in what follows— Smith’s re-
lationship with various ancient philosophical 
schools. And such a strategy, consisting of a 
critical and a constructive part, namely, getting 
rid of “systems” and then restoring “common 
sense” without assuming it to be unchangea-
ble, gives pride of place to “Wit”. In fact, every 
time Smith refutes “systems” in astronomy, 
ethics, natural theology or political economy, 
he is keen in reminding the reader that what 
he has to offer as an alternative is just another 
invisible chain or imaginary machine, less ar-
bitrary in so far as, instead of bending facts to 
fit theories, it makes room for phenomena as 
they are. 
5. Adam Smith’s anti-Cartesian ethics
 How selfish soever man may be supposed, 
there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of 
others (Smith 1759 I.I.i.1). 
This is the sentence with which Smith’s 
moral work starts. Note that Mandeville’s “li-
centious system” contended precisely that the 
selfish passions are the only force dominating 
human nature (Smith 1759 III.VII.iii. 27). Thus, 
Smith’s intentions are spelled out clearly, for an-
yone who has eyes to read, in the very first sen-
tence. That is, he tries to work out a post-scepti-
cal ethics, which implies that he is the opposite 
of a “sceptic” in the eighteenth-century current 
meaning, that of a “Phyrronist”, but also far 
from being a Cartesian, Stoic, Platonic ration-
alist, at least for the reason that he adopts a 
“deflationary” strategy starting with minimal 
requirement in order to force the sceptic to ad-
mit of some generally shared prescription. The 
structure of the argument is as follows:
(a)  let us assume, for the sake of the argu-
ment, that man is selfish;
(b)  yet, we observe that at least a few cas-
es he is interested in his neighbour’s 
lot;
(c)  once this “general phenomenon” has 
been sufficiently corroborated by ob-
servation;
(d)  we proceed to prove that there are 
some inescapable criteria according to 
which men cannot avoid judging hu-
man actions and feeling. 
The trick is that such inescapable crite-
ria, not unlike the apparent plausibility of the 
Newtonian system, far from deriving from an-
ything the sceptic wants to reject —say, God, 
a world order, essences, a priori relations— 
arise precisely from deception. For example, 
the principle of sympathy that interests us in 
the fortune of others is so overwhelming that
 we sympathize even with the dead, and 
overlooking what is of real importance in 
their situation […] we are chiefly affected 
by those circumstances which strike our 
senses, but can have no influence upon 
their happiness. It is miserable, we think, 
to be deprived of the light of the sun […] 
to be laid in the cold grave […] It is from 
this very illusion of the imagination, that 
[…] arises one of the most important prin-
ciples in human nature, the dread of death 
(Smith 1759 I.I.i.13; my emphasis).
Thus, Smith’s ethics could easily be, and in 
fact has been, misunderstood either as relativ-
ism or as Platonism. In fact, it is an attempt to 
mediate between two opposite poles: the Eye 
of the Universe on the one hand and unmed-
iated emotion on the other. As a consequence 
it is, more than a ready-made ethical theory, 
a dialogical approach to morality. Smith as-
sumes that our approval of actions is dictated 
“by immediate sense and feeling” (Smith 1759 
VII.II.ii.7), and
 general maxims of morality are formed, 
like all other general maxims, from expe-
rience and induction. We observe in a great 
variety of particular cases what pleases or 
displeases our moral faculties, what they 
approve or disapprove of, and, by induction 
from this experience, we establish those 
general rules (Smith 1759 II.II.ii.6). 
This is not ethical relativism. In both sci-
ence and morality there is at least something so 
obvious as to be undeniable, and both the scep-
tic and the rationalist finally miss the target by 
ruling out undeniable facts. 
This is exemplified by Smith’s reductio ad 
absurdum of Stoic theological consequential-
ism, which is carried out by proving that this 
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doctrine blurs the difference between virtue 
and vice. The Stoic ideal is the Eye of the 
Universe, that is, looking at oneself from the 
viewpoint of an absolutely impartial specta-
tor. It is true that this is an attitude somehow 
embodying the very essence of “sympathy” 
of “exchange of situations”, but it is also true 
that we can adopt it only when we distance 
ourselves from everyday concerns and that, 
as soon as we come back to everyday life, we 
cannot maintain such absolute impartiality 
any longer. Besides, this ideal taken literally 
is self-defeating in making moral judgment 
impossible. Stoic theological consequential-
ism, as understood by Smith, embodies both 
the principle of unintended results and that of 
unintended order. The former was not Smith’s 
discovery, and in fact it had already been for-
mulated by Montesquieu, and for both the 
former did not imply the second. Smith writes 
that the
 ancient stoics were of opinion that as the 
world was governed by the all-ruling prov-
idence of a wise, powerful, and good God, 
very single event ought to be regarded, as 
making a necessary part of the plan of the 
general order and happiness of the whole: 
that the vices and follies of mankind, there-
fore, made as necessary a part of this plan 
as their wisdom or their virtue: and that by 
the eternal art which educes good from ill, 
were made to tend equally to the prosperity 
and perfection of the great system of nature 
(Smith 1759 I.II.iii.4; my emphasis).
But —he adds— no speculation of such a 
kind could weaken “our natural abhorrence for 
vice, whose immediate effects are so destruc-
tive, and whose remote effects are too distant 
to be traced by the imagination” (Ibid.). The 
Stoic adopts the point of view of “the great 
Superintendant of the universe”, for whom 
what to us appear to be the greatest calamities, 
are like “the bursting of a bubble, as Mr Pope 
says” (Smith 1759 VII.II.i.40). To this, Smith 
opposes a different point of view, the “plan 
and system which Nature has sketched out for 
our conduct” (Smith 1759 VII.II.i.43) making 
room also for spontaneous tendencies of our 
sentiments and arguing that the impossibility 
to eliminate them depends more on the limits 
than on the greatness of human nature. It is be-
cause our imagination is so short-sighted that 
moral distinctions hold; had we foreknowl-
edge of distant events, even our abhorrence for 
evil would be blurred. Thus, deception rules in 
the life of the mind, it is unavoidable, and it is 
what makes moral distinctions possible. 
I mentioned Smith’s rather relaxed attitude 
vis-à-vis ancient philosophical schools. Their 
influence in his thought “appears as a com-
posite set of elements” (Vivenza 2001, 185), 
and the features in the life of the mind that had 
been highlighted by the sceptics play into the 
hands of the Stoics, Platonists and Cartesians, 
but also, vice versa, the reasons provided by 
the latter to back their conclusions turn out to 
be the wrong ones. In more detail, as far as Sto-
icism is concerned, Smith was not a neo-Stoic 
but instead a critic of Stoicism. He believed 
that a philosophy which “detects” some sort 
of world order does respond to a need of our 
imagination but is also a slippery view which 
one cannot consistently follow without ending 
with paradox. What he did in the pars constru-
ens of his ethics as well as of other disciplines 
was combining, in an almost alchemic way, 
individual elements from various ancient phi-
losophies8. 
In the 6th edition, in the context of a dis-
cussion of the nature of virtue, he treats at 
length systems that make virtue consist in 
propriety, that is, Platonism, Aristotelianism, 
and Stoicism, discussing the latter at length. 
After presenting the Stoics’ “very sublime 
views” (Smith 1759 VII.ii.i.38; my emphasis) 
which recommend an extraordinary degree of 
self-command, he discusses one of the most 
renowned Stoic paradox, namely the doctrine 
on suicide; he provides historical reasons for 
believing that “this fashion of voluntary death” 
was much more prevalent among the “proud 
Romans” than among the “lively, ingenious, 
and accommodating Greeks” and adds that it 
was followed by Romans of the Imperial age 
“rather from vanity and ostentation […] than 
from what would appear, even to a sober and 
judicious Stoic, any proper or necessary rea-
son” (Smith 1759 VII.ii.i.34). He adds that tra-
ditions concerning suicide by founders of the 
Stoic sect are of late origin and uncertain and 
reports three different traditions concerning 
8 For criticism of the Stoic-Adam-Smith view, see Vivenza 
1999b; 2001, 191-206; this implies that Smith neither was 
an “eclectic Stoic” (Montes 2008) nor “a half-conscious 
follower of Plato and Aristotle and therefore of Aquinas, 
and also of the stoics” (McCloskey 2008, 58), but just a 
critic of Stoicism, in so far as this philosophy was an 
expression of that spirit of system.
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the death of Zeno, the founder of the school. 
According to one of these,
 after enjoying, for ninety-eight years the 
most perfect state of health, he happened, 
in going out of his school, to fall; and 
though he suffered no other damage than 
that of breaking or dislocating one of his 
fingers, he struck the ground with his hand, 
and, in the words of the Niobe of Euripides, 
said, I come, why does thou call me? And 
immediately went home and hanged him-
self (Smith 1759 VII.ii.i.32).
And he comments: “At that great age, one 
should think, he might have had a little more 
patience” (Ibid.; my emphasis). That is, all that 
sounds so grand in popular stories of Stoic vir-
tue seems to be instead rather mean. 
6. Adam Smith’s anti-Cartesian economics 
The Wealth of Nations is one more exemplar 
of the new genre of treatises on commerce in-
augurated by Cantillon (1755), where two tra-
ditions met, the pamphleteers’ piecemeal eco-
nomic theorizing and the natural-law theoriz-
ing on property, price and exchange. Smith’s 
choice to develop the lectures on policy into 
a self-contained book depended on various 
reasons: (a) a political agenda, namely the on-
going Scottish discussion on wealth and civic 
virtue; (b) the already existing example pro-
vided by Cantillon’s and Turgot’s treatises of 
commerce; (c) his own peculiar epistemolo-
gy. It was thanks to the latter that he was in 
a position to reformulate the Physiocratic sys-
tem into a more abstract and plausible theory, 
whose strength —he believed— was avoiding 
assumptions flying in the face of common 
sense, such as identification of wealth with 
raw produce. The result was a theory where 
a conjectural-historical account of phenome-
na coexists with the construction of invisible 
chains providing connections between appar-
ently disconnected phenomena. 
“Systèmes” or systems in eighteenth-cen-
tury philosophical jargon, were too ambitious 
theories such as the Cartesian theory of vorti-
ces, whose vice was recourse to conjectures or 
bending facts to fit them to theories instead of 
saving the phenomena by introduction of no 
more principles than those that may connect 
phenomena with each other. Smith’s criticism 
of the “prevailing mercantile system” in his 
discussion of systems of political economy in 
Book IV may be understood as the main rhe-
torical goal of the work, and this critique pro-
vides a good case study in Wit. 
In the beginning —he argues— there are 
“popular notions” on money, such as may be 
suggested by custom. These “naturally” arise 
from its twofold function of instrument of 
commerce and of measure of value. Not un-
like primitives, who believed that fire burns, 
water refreshes, springs are inhabited by 
nymphs and trees by dryads, also the “pol-
ished nations”, as a result of a turn taken by 
their imagination, tend to believe that money 
is wealth, that there is some inherent quali-
ty in gold and silver. This is why the Span-
iards considered worth conquering only those 
lands that abounded in precious metals. The 
Tartars, instead, cherish strange notions about 
cattle. A French ambassador
 says that the tartars used frequently to ask 
him, if there was plenty of sheep and oxen 
in the kingdom of France […] Among the 
Tartars, as among all other nations of shep-
herds, who are generally ignorant of the 
use of money, cattle are the instruments 
of commerce and the measures of value. 
Wealth, therefore, according to them, con-
sisted in cattle, as according to the Span-
iards in consisted in gold and silver (Smith 
1776 IV.i.2). 
Note, here, an opposition of apparently 
grand things such as gold and silver and mean 
ones such as sheep and oxen. Smith’s conclud-
ing comment is: “Of the two, the tartar notion, 
perhaps, was the nearest to the truth” (Smith 
1776 IV.i.2). He goes on, then, illustrating how 
from such popular notions the prohibition to 
export gold and silver was inspired, but also 
how, as commerce developed, merchants found 
such prohibition inconvenient while provided 
against it “partly solid and partly sophistical” 
(Smith 1776 IV.i.9) arguments. The solid one 
was that to export money may be sometimes 
useful to a country; the sophistical one was 
that the government should act in order to 
grant a “favourable balance of trade”, that is, 
to secure that more metals were imported than 
those exported. The attention of government 
was turned away “from one fruitless care”, 
guarding against the exportation of gold and 
silver, “to another care, much more intricate, 
52 Cremaschi, S. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 4(1) 2017: 43-62
much more embarrassing, and just equally 
fruitless”, namely, watching “over the balance 
of trade” (Smith 1776 IV.i.10; my emphasis). 
The mentioned arguments were addressed 
 by those who were supposed to understand 
trade, to those who were conscious to them-
selves that they knew nothing about the mat-
ter. That foreign trade enriched the country, 
experience demonstrated to the nobles and 
country gentlemen, as well as to the mer-
chants: but how, or in what manner, none of 
them well knew. The merchants knew perfect-
ly in what manner it enriched themselves. It 
was their business to know it. But to know 
in what manner it enriched the country, was 
no part of their business (Smith 1776 IV.i.10). 
Note, again, that enriching the country is 
a grand object, juxtaposed to the merchants’ 
effort to enrich themselves, which is mean 
object, and that knowing nothing is contrast-
ed with knowing perfectly, apparently as the 
mean contrasted with the grand, but then the 
tables are turned, and perfectly turns out to ap-
ply to what is mean, while what is apparent-
ly grand is left in the company of nothing. If 
one takes a closer look at such arguments, it 
is clear enough that they amount to nothing, 
since the merchant never asked themselves 
how to enrich the country and they just needed 
to “to say something about the beneficial ef-
fects of foreign trade, and the manner in which 
those effects were obstructed by the laws as 
they then stood” (Smith 1776 IV.i.10). 
Smith adds that complaints of scarcity of 
money are often raised but
 Money, like wine, must always be scarce 
with those who have neither wherewithal 
to buy it, nor credit to borrow it. Those who 
have either, will seldom be in want either of 
the money, or of the wine which they have 
occasion for (Smith 1776 IV.i.16; my em-
phasis).
Here it is money, supposedly a grand object, 
to be contrasted with wine, a rather mean one. 
The point is that gold and silver are commod-
ities among others, the only difference being 
easier transportation and more stable value. 
Every time there is a real need of such commod-
ities, they are provided by market mechanisms. 
Besides, money is a commodity less indispen-
sable than many others, since it can be supplant-
ed by barter, buying and selling upon credit and 
well-regulated paper money, and thus it “would 
be too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove 
that wealth does not consist in money, or in gold 
and silver; but in what money purchases, and 
is valuable only for purchasing” (Smith 1776 
IV.i.17; my emphasis). The proof is that mon-
ey runs after commodities but the latter not al-
ways run after money, and it is no objection that 
consumable commodities are soon destroyed 
whereas “gold and silver could be accumulated 
for ages together, to the incredible augmenta-
tion of the real wealth of the country” (Smith 
1776 IV.i.19; my emphasis), since we do not 
reckon that trade disadvantageous which con-
sists in the exchange of the hardware of Eng-
land for the wines of France. In fact, hardware 
is a very durable commodity, and
 might too be accumulated for ages together, 
to the incredible augmentation of the pots 
and pans of the country (Ibid.; my empha-
sis). 
Note that real wealth is opposed, here, to 
pots and pans. This opposition serves once 
more the goal to show how “absurd” is any 
doctrine that would contend that more pots 
and pans would be of any use without a corre-
sponding increase in victuals to cook.
Smith concludes that “fatal experience” has 
sufficiently exposed “the folly of a system” 
that inspired ruinous conduct such as that of 
the various companies of East Indies and the 
“savage injustice” of the Europeans in admin-
istering the American colonies (Smith 1776 
IV.i.33). His alternative is the “simple and ob-
vious” system of natural liberty, described as 
something that establishes itself without any 
artificial intervention from above. All we need 
is a tolerable degree of liberty, justice, equali-
ty. In a word, in economics no less than ethics 
and natural philosophy, rationalistic systems 
miscarry and their sceptical antagonists hard-
ly do any better. But Smith, the author of the 
“Principles”, may have known too well that 
also such a tentative and imperfect kind of or-
der might have been mistaken by his alleged 
followers for the fixed Order of Nature. 
7. Invisible hands, economic and theological 
The invisible hand mentioned in The Wealth 
of Nations became popular toward the middle 
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of the twentieth century9. The phrase became 
popular in the social sciences at large as a sign-
post for theories based on unintended effects, 
unintended order, or evolution10. 
This would not have been too bad, if econ-
omists had tried to discover a theory behind 
the phrase.
The outcome has been odd enough. At least 
nine alternative interpretations have been list-
ed in a brilliant paper, namely
 (1) the force that makes the interest of one 
the interest of others, (2) the price mecha-
nism, (3) a figure for the idea of unintend-
ed consequences, (4) competition, (5) the 
mutual advantage in exchange, (6) a joke, 
(7) an evolutionary process, (8) providence, 
and (9) the force that restrains the export of 
capital (Grampp 2000, p. 450).
Samuelson (1948, 36) gave the term wide 
circulation under a meaning close to the first 
listed above, understood as a “mystical prin-
ciple” allegedly existing behind the phenom-
ena, what amounts to virtually the opposite 
of Smith’s original idea (Kennedy 2009, 250-
251). And yet, Smith had been popular among 
economists for almost two centuries with 
hardly any mention of the phrase. As a result 
of recently won popularity among economists, 
also Adam Smith scholars started paying atten-
tion to it, discovering in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments the poor man’s son passage to be 
compared with the domestic-investment pas-
sage from the Wealth of Nations, and later on 
with the invisible-hand-of-Jupiter passage in 
the “Principles”11.
All this culminated with the alleged “New 
View” advanced by self-styled “revisionists” 
who squeezed out of the phrase something 
against which Smith had been fighting for his 
whole life, namely a deductive social theory12. 
It consists of four claims: first, Smith endorsed 
several of the traditional proofs of God’s ex-
istence, first among them the Argument from 
Design (Hill 2001, 6); second, he claimed that 
order existing in the world is a morally good 
order implemented by Providence (Ibid.); third, 
9 For a reconstruction see Samuels 2011, xiii-xxvi, 139-46; 
cf. Rothschild 2002, 116.
10 See Samuels 2011, 59-82; Vogel 2017.
11 For an overview of conclusions about which there is a 
consensus in the literature see Samuels 2011, 30-35.
12 Oslington 2011 provides a comprehensive anthology of 
what has been produced by “New View” proponents.
he believed evil in the world to be only appar-
ent; fourthly, the “invisible hand” was literally 
the hand of the Christian God (Denis 2005, 16; 
Oslington 2011b, 71 and 67). Its proponents 
announced an intention to mend misreading in-
troduced by the twentieth-century “secularizing 
turn” while rescuing allegedly theological read-
ings by “early commentators” (Hill 2001, 1-4). 
One objection is that the first readers nev-
er suspected a theological dimension in The 
Wealth of Nations. It is true that the “Christian 
Political Economists” elaborated on Smithian 
ideas, among them unintended order, while 
adding a theological dimension. Thomas Chal-
mers wrote that the
 greatest economic good is rendered to the 
community […] by the spontaneous play 
and busy competition of many thousand 
wills, each bent on the persecution of his 
own selfishness […] which bespeack the 
skill of a master-hand, in the adjustment of 
its laws (Chalmers 1833, 238-239; empha-
sis added).
and Richard Whately that
 man is, in the same act, doing one thing 
by choice […] and another, undesignedly, 
under the care of the Providence (Whately 
1832, 94). 
And yet, far from “early commentators”, 
they were original thinkers working out their 
own views without even bothering to cite 
Smith’s relevant passages. In fact, Chalmers 
mentioned a master-hand, not an invisible one, 
and Whately repeated a familiar doctrine about 
Providence without any mention of hands of 
any kind. Shortly after —without waiting the 
twentieth-century “secularizing turn”— the 
two Mills started swearing on Smith’s unbelief, 
and the German historical school proclaiming 
instead Smith’s “Deism” —a term that in the 
eighteenth-century did not refer to belief in God 
but was instead an allegation of Atheism in drag 
while the German Historicists used it instead 
as an allegation of “metaphysical dogmatism” 
(Rothschild 2002, 118; Cremaschi 2017). 
8. The invisible hand as irony and as metaphor
A few sensible voices have been heard in re-
cent years trying to mend the rips. Rothschild 
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(2002, 116) argues that “Smith did not es-
pecially esteem the invisible hand” and the 
phrase “is best interpreted as a mildly ironic 
joke”; she also notes the kind of kinship sub-
sisting between the “invisible hand” and “in-
visible beings” as well as “invisible chains” on 
the other (Rothschild 2002, 120-121); anoth-
er plausible consideration is that there is one 
sense in which Smith may have not been ironic 
about the invisible hand, namely if taken as a 
catch-phrase for the idea of unintended order 
in general (Rothschild 2002, 135; cf. Vogel 
2016, 99-104); and the conclusion is also plau-
sible that the phrase indicates “a system which 
soothes the imagination, and which might or 
might not correspond to relations in society” 
(Rothschild 2002, 137). 
Nonetheless a few objections may be raises. 
The first is that Rothschild (2002, 129-131) in-
troduces an unnecessary argument for Smith’s 
irreligion, and this is vitiated by deficient ac-
quaintance with the religious context; for ex-
ample, she does not even suspect that derision 
of Catholic religious practices was, more than 
a proof of irreligion, a must for any pious Prot-
estant. The second is that her effort to prove 
the human, rather than divine, character of the 
invisible hand is redundant, precisely because 
the ambiguity may have been left on purpose 
by Smith in order to produce the desired rhe-
torical effect. The third is that she does not 
draw all the possible consequences from the 
references she makes to other invisible entities. 
Kennedy adds that the phrase has no uni-
vocal theological connotation, being a wide-
spread way of saying referring to both divine 
and human hands, and that it is “a metaphor, 
complying with the rules of grammar”, name-
ly, “an allusion betwixt one object and another” 
which is felicitous if “it gives the due strength 
of expression to the object described and at 
the same time does this in a more striking and 
interesting manner” (Kennedy 2011, 56; cf. 
Samuels 2011, 142-163). He lists a number 
of texts where the phrase shows up with ref-
erence to pretty human hands (Kennedy 2009, 
242-243). Besides, he insists that, were we to 
take the phrase as an emblem for the unintend-
ed-results principle, the principle is believed 
by Smith to yield as many pernicious as ben-
eficial effects (Kennedy 2009, 255-259). And 
he concludes that Smith had no “theory” of the 
invisible hand, that he used it as a well-known 
eighteenth-century literary metaphor, and he 
gave it “no role in his theory of competitive 
markets in Books I and II of the Wealth of Na-
tions” (Kennedy 2009, 240).
A dissenting voice is Peter Harrison. He 
starts with a reconstruction of the story of the 
idea of God’s hand in Christian theology from 
the first centuries to eighteenth-century Scot-
land (Harrison 2011a, 32-39). His reconstruc-
tion is fine, and it may be usefully combined 
with Samuels’s own (Samuels 2011, 20-29) 
since both provide evidence of widespread use 
in a variety of context as well as of some con-
tinuity between religious and secular contexts. 
Yet, a number of further conclusions Harrison 
draws may be turned upside down. His argu-
ment starts with the claim that at least several 
passages from The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
allow ascription of theological commitments 
to Smith. Harrison writes that
 Smith’s lining up of perceived regularities 
in the moral and physical realms, and his 
apparent attribution of these to providence, 
provided a clear warrant for reading him as 
endorsing a general natural theology and of 
using the invisible hand as another way of 
speaking about divine providence (Harri-
son 2011a, 47). 
It is as well to note that he keeps his dis-
tance from the self-styled “New View” at least 
on one specific point, when he writes that “one 
reading of Smith would see his invocation of 
the invisible hand as […] denying recourse to 
special providence while retaining some role 
for general providence” (Harrison 2011a, 44). 
Let me add that “special providence” means 
God’s exceptional interventions, which may 
imply a change in the workings of the laws 
of nature, that is, miracle. To be fair, Harrison 
concludes that Oslington’s God-and-the Mar-
ket doctrine is, more than the final interpreta-
tion of Smith’s writings, just a plausible one, 
and lists among admissible candidates also the 
alternative “conventionalist” reading proposed 
by Haakonnsen and others according to which 
“the invisible hand, like the law of gravitation, 
was an artefact of the human imagination” 
(Harrison 2011a, 48). But the main proof he 
advances in support of the realist reading is 
apparently that “few commentators regard 
Smith’s references to Newtonian physics as 
ironic or rhetorical” (Ibid.), and from this he 
draws the inference that Smith was at least 
“conscious of being psychologically commit-
ted to the validity of both natural science and 
55Cremaschi, S. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 4(1) 2017: 43-62
natural theology” (Ibid.). It is, to say the least, 
a rather weak kind of proof. One may object 
that majority rule is a criterion accepted in 
democratic politics, not in intellectual history, 
and thus Harrison, who has done such a won-
derful work in the first part of the paper with 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sources, 
could have made the effort to be less noncha-
lant vis-à-vis twentieth-century commentators, 
however “few” they may have been. There are 
indeed a few of them who argued that Smith’s 
interpretation of Newtonian physics was that 
of an anti-Cartesian who, while fully persuad-
ed of Newton’s superiority vis-à-vis Descartes, 
concluded nonetheless that the Newtonian sys-
tem might not be read in realist terms, and that 
this conclusion was made unavoidable by the 
tension he felt between the acknowledgment 
of the Newtonian system’s superiority and the 
admission of a permanently hypothetical char-
acter of any theory13. This was the reason why 
he manifested his feeling that there was, in his 
manuscript, “more refinement than solidity”, 
a statement that hardly sounds as a positive 
assessment of the validity of natural science. 
Half a century ago, Moscovici suggested that 
we
 cannot be sure that Adam Smith had clear-
ly grasped that difficulty, but he has surely 
felt it, while realizing that it was not pos-
sible to talk about Newton’s system in the 
same way in which he was talking about 
other systems. The heaven of the past and 
of theory is faced with the earth of present 
and of the real which is grasped by science. 
Starting with a social and psychological 
account of philosophy, Smith is insensibly 
drawn to talk of it as if it was but imagina-
tion, and finally he cannot avoid finding in 
the imaginary a bit of reality. His reflection 
has not dwelt on these conundrums and his 
“philosophy of science” has been nothing 
more than a sketch, echoing his contempo-
raries’ troubles (Moscovici 1956, 10; my 
translation). 
He adds that there are two sides in the New-
tonian theory, namely that of a system which 
the mind may view as its own creation and that 
of a tool useful for everyday life and, while 
13 Among them Moscovici 1956; Lindgren 1973, 1-19; 
Wightman 1975; Megill 1975; Hetherington 1983; Cremaschi 
2000; 2009.
the instrumental dimension of other systems 
has gone lost to the point that we tend to think 
that it never existed, Newton’s system is still 
basic for us. He adds that we “cannot be sure 
that Adam Smith clearly spelled out such a co-
nundrum, but surely he did perceive it” (Ibid.), 
and thus in the “Principles” we find an idea 
somehow echoing Blaise Pascal, namely that 
“the system, albeit not true at retail price, may 
be true wholesale” (Moscovici 1956, 18-19)14. 
Taking advantage of such universally ignored 
suggestion, the following objections may be 
raised. 
First, Harrison’s reconstruction of theologi-
cal uses is based on abundant textual evidence, 
and proves that the phrase had wide currency 
in eighteenth-century literature with reference 
precisely to God’s hand, and yet, the weakness 
of his second part depends on rather naïve 
use of textual evidence, as if any utterance 
would always be embodied in the same kind 
of speech act, namely assertion. But after John 
Austin, Paul Grice, and Quentin Skinner, it is 
obvious that this is blatantly false, that we do 
utter or quote a phrase in order, for ex., to play 
on ambiguity, to subvert its meaning through 
word pun, or to exert irony, sarcasm or ridi-
cule by juxtaposing incompatible elements or 
exploiting equivocal senses, for ex. the sense 
of invisible as supernatural and that of out of 
sight or hidden by a screen.
Secondly, the hand of Jupiter is dismissed 
without argument, writing that it “seems to 
be simply a metaphor, not drawing upon any 
developed conception of the invisible hand 
and unrelated to his other two references”15. 
Yet, there is some literature arguing precise-
ly the opposite, and it should have been dis-
cussed no less than Oslington’s (unwarranted) 
claim that Smith, by the word Jupiter, meant 
the Christian God. Vivenza (2008) pointed at 
a plausible source for Smith’s passage on the 
hand of Jupiter while contributing in making 
it clear that he was not endorsing any kind 
of hand-of-Jupiter explanation. Lindgren had 
earlier illustrated the context where the pas-
sage fits, namely a critique of philosophical 
monotheism, which Smith declares to be log-
ically inconsistent and both intellectually less 
respectable and morally more repugnant than 
polytheism itself (Lindgren 1973, 136-141; cf. 
Pack 1995: 302-303). The further consider-
14 Cf. Cremaschi 2009, 87; Samuels 2011, 85.
15 Harrison 2011a, 45. 
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ation may be added that the principles of the 
human mind account more easily for polythe-
ism than other doctrines, including philosophi-
cal monotheism (Smith 1795 Astronomy III.3; 
Ancient Physics 9) or the Cartesian theory of 
vortices (Smith 1795 Astronomy IV.66-67) 
which result from a disease of the imagination, 
namely an excessive desire to simplify. Pol-
ytheism is just a rather naïve produce of the 
principles of imagination, an anthropomorphic 
view of nature meant to sooth wonder caused 
by unexpected events by feigning behind them 
invisible beings acting not in order to support 
“the ordinary course of things, which went on 
of its own accord, but to stop, to thwart, and to 
disturb it” (Smith 1795, Astronomy III.2; cf. 
Cremaschi 2017). Jupiter´s hand is mentioned 
not as the hand of the Christian God but as that 
of a heathen divinity, one more of those “invis-
ible entities” (Smith 1795, Astronomy III.2)16 
feigned by “that vulgar superstition which as-
cribes all the irregular events of nature to the 
favour or displeasure of intelligent, though 
invisible beings, to gods, daemons, witches, 
genii, fairies” (Smith 1795 Astronomy III.2; 
my emphasis). Note that Smith is practising 
precisely irony (Jupiter, allegedly something 
grand, juxtaposed with something mean such 
as obvious facts from everyday life).
Thirdly, there are also cases where the 
phrase had been used without any religious 
meaning. Besides those listed by Rothschild 
and Kennedy, I will discuss one more in the 
following section. 
To sum up, continuity between Jupiter’s 
hand and the two invisible hands in the main 
works has been assumed by “New-View” pro-
ponents without providing textual evidence, 
and then used as a proof of the identity of both 
with the Christian God’s hand. Harrison im-
plies that this is a non sequitur but he does so 
in a surprisingly reticent way and omits men-
tioning that the mistake he is rejecting is pre-
cisely Oslington’s.
9. The invisible hand between irony and 
metaphor 
In this section I sketch a viable reading of the 
phrase “invisible hand”. Rothschild (2002, 
119) suggested that we should decompose the 
history of the phrase into its constituent ideas 
16 Cf. Vivenza 2008; Lindgren 1973, 135-7; Pack 1995, 295-6. 
and this is precisely what I do in this section. 
Such decomposition implies examining, first, 
semantics, that is, the map of correspondenc-
es and oppositions in one author’s diction-
ary, secondly, rhetoric and pragmatic, that is, 
speech acts and communicative intentions. Let 
me examine, first, three terms from Smith’s 
dictionary, and then various kinds of speech 
act he performs.
Semantic interpretation: invisible, hand, motion
(i) invisible. Uses of the adjective “invisi-
ble” have been examined by Rothschild (2002, 
120). I would like to add that the phrase “in-
visible hand” shows up, besides other non-re-
ligious contexts, in a letter to Newton of 18 
March 1712/1713 by his disciple Roger Cotes 
in the context of an objection concerning grav-
itation; he argues that attraction of one planet 
by another caused by a non observable prin-
ciple such as vis attractiva would look to any 
observer as the effect of an “invisible hand” 
(invisible to an observer from a specific loca-
tion) pushing a globe laying on a table toward 
another globe. He writes:
 Suppose two globes A & B placed at a dis-
tance from each other upon a table, & that 
whilst A remains at rest B is moved towards 
it by an Invisible Hand. A by-stander who 
observes this motion but not the cause of 
it, will say that B does certainly tend to the 
centre of A, & thereupon he may call the 
force of the invisible Hand the centripetal 
force of B, or the attraction of A since ye 
effect appears the same as if it did truly pro-
ceed from a proper & real attraction of A 
(Newton 1975, 149)17. 
In other words, Cotes points at an example 
of non-observed cause of an observed motion. 
His hand is not the hand of a God imparting 
motion to celestial bodies; it is just a human 
hand pushing a globe. His point is that there is 
a possibility to account for one and the same 
phenomenon in two alternative ways. Thus, 
use of the phrase is important for us, first, as 
evidence of use of the adjective “invisible” in 
the down-to-earth sense of “hidden” and, sec-
ondly, as evidence of use of this phrase in a 
scientific context while discussing precisely an 
issue that would have been of interest to Smith 
17 Cf. Cremaschi 2002, 101-2.
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the historian of science, namely the equiva-
lence of action at a distance with transmission 
of motion by impulse. The above example may 
be compared with a passage from the “Princi-
ples” declaring that the
 motion of a small piece or iron along a plain 
table is in itself no extraordinary object, yet 
the person who first saw it begin, without 
any visible impulse, in consequence of the 
motion of a loadstone some little distance 
from it, could not behold it without the 
most extreme Surprise; and when that mo-
mentary emotion was over, he would still 
wonder how it came to be enjoined to an 
event so little suspected it to have any con-
nection (Smith 1795, Astronomy III.2). 
Smith adds that, in this case, we feel a want 
of connection between two objects, and the 
fact of discovering or imagining it is enough to 
sooth our imagination.
(ii) Hands
Ernst Lluch (1998) argued that the legacy 
of Jansenism is important for Smith and Man-
deville’s idea of private vices turned into pub-
lic virtues comes from Jansenist Pierre Nicole 
(1771). Mandeville had exploited the latter’s 
idea of a distinction between two realms of 
virtue, the former being sham virtue but good 
enough to keep order in the earthly city, the 
other being the true one, useless for this world 
but necessary for the other. The former results 
from “deft manipulation by a skilful poli-
tician” playing with human passions like a 
puppeteer with marionettes. Human passions 
are directed into the right channels not by ac-
tion of an invisible hand understood as a vis 
a tergo pushing human beings in a direction 
they did not choose, but rather by the hand of 
an architect who has designed the channels. 
And Smith, by the phrase “invisible hand”, 
was paraphrasing precisely this idea (Lluch 
1998, 163). 
Rothschild (2002, 129-130) aptly adds a 
comparison of invisible-hand passages with 
the chessboard one, where the “man of sys-
tem”
 seems to imagine that he can arrange the 
different members of a great society with 
as much ease as the hand arranges the dif-
ferent pieces upon a chess-board. He does 
not consider that the piece upon the chess-
board has no other principle of motion of its 
own, altogether different from that which 
the legislature might chose to impress upon 
it (Smith 1759 VI.II.ii.17). 
Note that the hand, here, is not just in-
visible but is also imaginary. The politi-
cian’s hand is in itself made of flesh and 
bones, but qua external cause impressing 
motion on the members of society it is just 
dreamt of. Note also that the metaphor is, 
here, primarily an anthropomorphic one 
—the ruler-subjects relationship is analo-
gous to the player-pawns one. But, below 
the waterline, there is another physico-po-
litical metaphor, whose focus is motion. In 
fact, the hand of the Imperial Reformer is 
visible and it is vainly interfering with the 
“principle of motion” with which every in-
dividual is endowed. But I would suggest, 
unlike Rothschild (2002, 125), that the lat-
ter is not the delusory “independence and 
idiosyncrasy of individuals”, but rather the 
same principle Smith indicates on other oc-
casions by the phrase “invisible hand” and 
the object of his scorn is here the Imperial 
Reformer, not his subjects. 
Note also that the theme on which Smith’s 
rhetoric elaborates is provided here not by 
hands, either visible or invisible, but by what 
the latter are supposed to impart to bodies, 
namely, motion. The focus of the simile is the 
analogy subsisting between literal motion in 
physical systems and metaphorical motion in 
human society. Thus, besides uses of the term 
“hand”, it is as well to examine those of the 
term “motion”.
(iii) Motion
Motion was the key-idea of post-Renais-
sance science. The controversy between New-
tonians and Cartesians turned around its trans-
mission by action at a distance. One of the 
main topics in the “Principles” is precisely the 
mind’s capacity to reduce motions in the uni-
verse to a unitary system by providing imagi-
nary missing links. 
The three invisible-hand passages do, in 
different degrees, evoke the idea of motion. 
In the first, Jupiter’s hand is not yet invoked 
by primitives to make so that “heavy bodies 
descend, and lighter substances fly upwards”. 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, deception 
“rouses and keeps in continual motion the in-
dustry of mankind”. In The Wealth of Nations, 
what is left of the physical metaphor is the 
idea that “every individual is led to promote 
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an end” (Smith 1795, Astronomy IV.II.9; 1759 
IV.1.11; 1776 IV.II.9; my emphasis). 
Talk of hands —I have suggested— is not 
so much about hands themselves as about 
motion. Smith’s intention is not to prove the 
existence of a providential order —in fact, ei-
ther we cannot help seeing it or, on the con-
trary, we may conclude that our seeing is no 
more than deception— but instead he wants to 
makes us see a chaos of discordant motions as 
a unified system. The pre-analytic vision aris-
ing from this analogy is one where self-inter-
est —following a familiar Renaissance com-
monplace— is the spring which sets individ-
uals in motion. The various elements of which 
the body of society is composed are endowed 
with their own original motion and, not unlike 
Newtonian attractive forces, forces causing 
motion in society also bring about its cohesion.
Pragmatic interpretation
Speech acts are not just an everyday language af-
fair. Science itself has grown through controver-
sies and the latter are made of speech acts which, 
among other things, have recourse to metaphor, 
analogy and other tropes. Thus, to Rothschild’s 
and Kennedy’s useful suggestions, the consider-
ation may be added that irony never is just irony 
and metaphor never is just metaphor18. Let me 
add that Smith’s choice of terminology was sel-
dom casual, and even less in the invisible-hand 
passages (Rothschild 2002, 137). 
This implies that individual terms should 
be arranged in a network of meanings and, 
besides, we should be aware that some of 
them are over-determined by philosophical 
assumptions spelled out elsewhere —think of 
invisible hands in the main works and “invis-
ible beings”, “invisible causes” and “invisible 
chains” in the “Principles”. This does not de-
tract, on the contrary it adds, support to Roth-
schild’s claim that the author’s communicative 
intention was in both works ironical. Indeed 
the ironic effect is produced by contrasting the 
mean motives of the poor man’s son and the 
merchant with the grand effects of their action. 
These are, in the former case, providing sub-
sistence to the labouring poor and fostering the 
process of civilization (Smith 1759 IV.i.10), in 
the latter, indirectly contributing “to render the 
annual revenue of the society as great” as pos-
sible” (Smith 1776 IV.ii.9). The mean motives 
18 For a similar point see Pack 1996.
are, in the former case, the attempt to secure 
“a certain artificial and elegant repose which 
he may never arrive at” (Smith 1759 IV.i.10) 
and, in the latter case, the preoccupation to 
promote only the merchant’s “own security” 
and “his own gain” (Smith 1776 IV.ii.9). The 
rich man’s son’s intention is mean both intel-
lectually and morally, for is both an unrealistic 
end and an unsafe road to “the real happiness 
of human life” (Smith 1759 IV.i.10), while the 
merchant’s intention is morally indifferent —it 
may even be, to a certain extent, virtuous— 
but it is mean when compared with the inter-
est of society as a whole, in so far as, as the 
above section on the mercantile system has 
illustrated ad abundatiam, the merchant’s in-
terest is not “that of the society”. Let me men-
tion, another among “many other cases” when 
human beings are “led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of [their] 
intention” (Smith 1776 IV.ii.9), that feudal 
lords promoted an unintended grand end, “the 
regular execution of justice” and “the peace of 
the country” (Smith 1776 III.iv.15), by “selling 
their birth-right, not like Esau for a mess of 
pottage in time of hunger and necessity, but in 
the wantonness of plenty, for trinkets and bau-
bles” (Smith 1776 III.iv.15).
It goes beyond the point whether the hand 
belongs to Jupiter or to the Christian God, 
or anybody else, and whether it is invisible 
by its nature or rather just non-observable. I 
have already quoted Rothschild’s remark that 
the phrase indicates “a system which soothes 
the imagination, and which might or might 
not correspond to relations in society” (Roth-
schild 2002, 137) and, since the argument’s 
soundness does not depend on the hand’s real 
existence, a fortiori it does not depend on its 
human or divine nature. Smith, in fact, did not 
hesitate to mention the Divinity when it was 
appropriate to do so, but, first, he had it clear 
in mind that it was out of place in this context, 
namely the discussion of commercial policies, 
and, secondly, the only time he identified the 
invisible hand with the hand of a god, it was 
a heathen god, not the Christian one. And yet, 
the fact of avoiding explicit mention of God 
while using a phrase recurrent in Presbyterian 
preaching may have been intentional, in so far 
as the contrast between the rich’s and the mer-
chant’s meanness and God’s grandness may 
have evoked scorn, taking precisely the rich 
and the merchant as targets. Note that also Ju-
piter’s grandness contrasted with the meanness 
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of everyday-life phenomena was apt to pro-
duce sarcasm, whose target was not the savage 
but the philosophical monotheist. The commu-
nicative intention may easily detected, namely, 
in the former case, poking fun at the rich and 
the merchant by associating their conduct with 
something grand in order to remind us of how 
mad or how insignificant a conduct inspired 
by mean motives may look once described 
with a grand name, in the latter, poking fun 
at philosophical monotheists by juxtaposing 
their grand inferences to the mean, but more 
warranted, inferences drawn by primitives. It 
is clearly not a literal statement of a fact but a 
rhetorical figure, metaphor, employed to enact 
irony while evoking —by metonymy encap-
sulated within metaphor— human folly. But 
it is more than rhetorical embellishment, it is 
an essential part of the argument, and indeed 
the rhetorical figure is made plausible by the 
author’s peculiar epistemology. 
In another respect, the phrase may be just 
an emblematic way to indicate two distinct 
phenomena, namely, unintended results and 
unintended emergence of order. When thus 
understood, the whole of Smith’s social theo-
ry could be said to turn around the “invisible 
hand”. But, first, such order is much less than 
general equilibrium; it is emerging of order 
without design in those cases when some kind 
of order does emerge. And yet, Smith implied 
that both principles are at work in quite a num-
ber of cases; but just on two occasions did he 
resort to this rhetorical figure. It is as well to 
think that, by so doing, he wanted to stress 
some particularity in the workings of both 
principles in these and similar cases (Roth-
schild 2002, 135-136; Smith 2009). 
To sum up, the first invisible hand is clear-
ly a divine hand, but of a pagan deity, not of 
the Christian God; for the second and the third 
hand, the question whether they are divine or 
human is the typical question of those who 
never understand jokes, and had Smith meant 
God’s hand, he would have just said so. There 
may have been a rhetorical overtone in the 
choice of a term widely used by Presbyterian 
preachers, but this may have been an intention-
al side-effect, not the focus of the rhetorical 
figure. Thus, we may safely assume that the 
focus of the metaphor was motion, considered 
as the effect of impulse from outside, not the 
hands, considered as a tri-dimensional object. 
A more interesting question is: where are 
the invisible hands when the actions of indi-
viduals have malign outcomes for society? 
Kennedy (2009, 255) has listed a number of 
instances of “malign consequences of self-in-
terested actions” from the Wealth of Nations. 
I would add that the kind of order that does 
emerge, whenever it does is a morally defec-
tive order and, on balance, more an additional 
source of unhappiness than of well-being. Har-
rison himself —contradicting once more Os-
lington— admits that there are many reasons 
“to consider that the invisible hand can work 
in reverse […] the system is a negative theo-
dicy, a denial of theodicy, a theory that says 
that we can ignore theodicy” (Harrison 2011b, 
102-103; cf. Cremaschi 2010). 
10. Conclusions: post-scepticism, irony, and 
the art of not understanding jokes
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, at 
the time of discussion of the Corn Laws and 
the Poor Laws, The Wealth of Nations started 
being quoted in the British Parliament by pro-
ponents of opposite policies invoking a scien-
tific authority to back their divergent claims. 
They started quoting propositions he had re-
ported in order to refute them as if they were 
his own. Also the twentieth-century construc-
tion of a Smithian invisible-hand doctrine —
not to mention the superposition of a theologi-
cal pinnacle— results from the same astonish-
ing kind of hermeneutics first practiced in the 
British Parliament. 
I have mentioned that the phrase has be-
come a catchword for two distinct theoretical 
artefacts, namely the unintended results prin-
ciple and the unintended order theory. Both 
are seminal ideas without which the social 
sciences would have hardly yielded anything 
in the last two centuries (Vogel 2016, 99-104) 
and both lay at the core of Smith’s theories of 
language, morality, and the economy (Otte-
son 2002, 285-289). Yet, Smith himself nev-
er labelled such theories by the tag “invisible 
hand”. The circumstance that a phrase used on 
a couple of occasions was adopted as a name 
for a whole family of theories is curious, al-
beit, in itself, absolutely innocent. Language 
does work this way and anybody is free to pick 
up any beautiful phrase he likes to dub his own 
theory. But the circumstance has been mislead-
ing for at least two reasons: first, it has been 
muddling up the distinction between two dif-
ferent principles and, in this way, the sugges-
60 Cremaschi, S. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 4(1) 2017: 43-62
11. References
Broadie, Alexander. 2013. Scottish Philosophy in the 18th Century, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), ed. by E.N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/
entries/scottish-18th/>.
Brown, John. [1751] 1969. On Ridicule, considered as a test of Truth. In Essays on the Characteristics of 
the Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. by D.E. Eddy. Hildesheim/New York: Olms, pp. 1-107.
Cantillon, Richard. [1755] 1979. Essai de la nature du commerce en général, ed. by T. Tsudam. Tokyo: 
Kinokuniya Book-Store. 
Chalmers, Thomas. [1833] 2009. On the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Cremaschi, Sergio 1989. Adam Smith. Sceptical Newtonianism, disenchanted republicanism, and the birth 
of social science. In M. Dascal and O. Gruengard (eds.), Knowledge and Politics, Case Studies on the 
Relationship between Epistemology and Political Philosophy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 83-
110. 
Cremaschi, Sergio. 2000. Les Lumières Écossaises et le roman philosophique de Descartes. In Y. 
Senderowicz and Y. Wahl (eds.), Descartes, Reception and Disenchantment. Tel Aviv: University 
Publishing Projects, pp. 65-88.
Cremaschi, Sergio. 2002. Metaphors in “The Wealth of Nations”. In S. Boehm, Ch. Gierke, H. Kurz and R. 
Sturm (eds.), Is There Progress in Economics? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 89-114.
Cremaschi, Sergio. 2009. Newtonian physics, experimental moral philosophy, and the shaping of political 
economy. In R. Arena, Sh. Dow and M. Klaes (eds), Open Economics. Economics in Relation to Other 
Disciplines Oxford: Routledge, pp. 73-94.
Cremaschi, Sergio. 2010. La teodicea social de Adam Smith. Empresa y Humanismo, 13(1), 333-374.
Cremaschi, Sergio. 2017. Invisible Beings. Adam Smith’s lectures on natural religion, The Adam Smith 
Review, 10 (forthcoming).
Denis, Andy. 2005. The invisible hand of God in Adam Smith, A Research Annual. Research in the History 
of Economic Thought and Methodology, 23-A, pp. 1-32.
Fleischacker, Samuel. 2017. Adam Smith’s moral and political philosophy, in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), ed. by E.N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2017/entries/smith-moral-political/>.
Fleischacker, Samuel. 2012. Sympathy in Hume and Smith: a contrast, critique, and reconstruction, in Fricke 
Ch. and Føllesdal D. (eds.), Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A 
Collection of Essays. Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 273-312.
Forbes, Duncan. 1976. Sceptical Whiggism, commerce and liberty. In A.S. Skinner and Th. Wilson (eds.), 
Essays on Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 179-201.
Grampp, William. 2000. What did Smith mean by the invisible hand?, Journal of Political Economy, 
108(3), pp. 441-465. DOI: 10.1086/262125.
tion has been smuggled in that unintended re-
sults yield order —which, according to Smith, 
is true just in 50% of cases, while in the other 
50% they yield catastrophe— and secondly, it 
has provoked a short-circuit in intellectual his-
tory giving birth to the inquiry into a non-ex-
isting Smithian doctrine. 
The point not to loose of sight is that the 
three invisible hands are made of the same 
staple as the invisible entities mentioned in 
the “Principles”. Readers unaware of Smith’s 
own peculiar epistemology have been led to 
read such phrases as referring to real entities 
—for ex., Samuelson’s market mechanism or 
Oslington’s general and special providence— 
while, for Smith, any invisible entity is just 
an imaginary one. Thus, his subtle irony, be-
sides having different targets and carrying dif-
ferent implications in each passage, is all the 
time also self-irony, not unlike when, in the 
“Principles”, he candidly admits to have been 
insensibly drawn to talk of inventions of the 
imagination as if they were the discovery of an 
immense chain of the most important and sub-
lime truths. Irony and limited scepticism were 
inseparable tools from his own intellectual kit 
precisely because his strength rested precisely 
on awareness of how little we know. But his 
post-scepticism was so sophisticated and his 
irony so subtle that comments by both follow-
ers and critics have been mainly exercises in 
the art of not understanding jokes. 
61Cremaschi, S. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 4(1) 2017: 43-62
Griswold, Charles L. 1999. Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hanley, Ryan P. 2010. Scepticism and naturalism in Smith, The Adam Smith Review, 5, pp. 198-212.
Harrison, Peter. 2011a. Adam Smith and the History of the Invisible Hand, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
72(1), 29-49. DOI: 10.1353/jhi.2011.0007.
Harrison, Peter. 2011b. Adam Smith, natural theology, and the natural sciences. In P. Oslington (ed.), Adam 
Smith as Theologian. New York: Routledge, pp. 72-91.
Hetherington, Norris S. 1983. Isaac Newton’s Influence on Adam Smith’s natural laws in economics, 
Journal of the History of Ideas. 44(3), 497-505. DOI: 10.2307/2709178.
Hill, Liza. 2001. The hidden theology of Adam Smith, The European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought, 8(1), 1-30. DOI: 10.1080/713765225.
Hobbes, Thomas. [1651] 1996. Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Commonwealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by R. Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hume, David. [1739-40] 2001. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Hume, David. [1748] 1975. An Enquiry concerning human understanding. In Enquiries concerning Human 
Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge with text. rev. by P.H. 
Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hutcheson, Francis. [1725] 1990. Hibernicus’s letters. In Collected Works, ed. by B. Fabian, Hildesheim: 
Olms, vol. 7, pp. 101-169.
Johnson, Samuel [1755] 1996. A Dictionary of the English Language, Compact Disk edition, ed. by A. M. 
Dermott, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kennedy, Gavin. 2009. Adam Smith and the invisible hand, from metaphor to myth, Econ Journal Watch, 
6(2), 239-63 retrievable at https://econjwatch.org/articles/adam-smith-and-the-invisible-hand-from-
metaphor-to-myth
Kennedy, Gavin. 2011. Adam Smith and the role of the metaphor of an invisible hand, Economic Affairs, 
31(1), 53-57 retrievable at https://econjwatch.org/articles/adam-smith-and-the-invisible-hand-from-
metaphor-to-myth?ref=articles
Lindgren, John R. 1973. The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Lluch, Ernst. 1998. Jansenismo y Polizeiwissenschaft en Adam Smith, Revista de Economía Aplicada, 
6(18), 157-67 retrievable at http://www.revecap.com/revista/ingles/default.html
Locke, John. [1690] 1976. An Essay on Human Understanding, ed. by J. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon.
Macfie, Alec L. and David D. Raphael. 1976. Introduction. In Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 1-52.
McCloskey, Deirdre. 2008. Adam Smith, the last of the former virtue ethicists, History of Political Economy, 
40(1), pp. 43-71. DOI: 10.1215/00182702-2007-046.
Megill, A.D. (1975), Theory and experience in Adam Smith, Journal of the History of Ideas, 36(1), 79-94. 
DOI: 10.2307/2709012
Ménager, Daniel. 1995. La renaissance et le rire. PUF: Paris. 
Montes, Leonidas. 2008. Adam Smith as an eclectic Stoic, The Adam Smith Review, 4, 30-56. DOI: 
10.4324/9780203888384.ch4
Moscovici, Serge. 1956. À propos de quelques travaux d’Adam Smith sur l’histoire et la philosophie des 
sciences, Revue d’histoire des sciences et de leur applications, 9(1), 1-22 retrievable at http://www.
persee.fr/doc/rhs_0048-7996_1956_num_9_1_4345 DOI: 10.3406/rhs.1956.4345
Newton, Isaac. 1975. The Correspondence, vol. 5, ed. by R. Hall and L. Tilling. London: Cambridge 
University Press.
Nicole, Pierre. [1671] 1971. Des moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes. In Essais de morale, vol. 
1. Genève: Slatkine Reprints.
Oslington, Peter. 2011b. Divine action, Providence and Adam Smith’s invisible hand. In P. Oslington (ed.), 
Adam Smith as Theologian. New York: Routledge, pp. 1-16.
Otteson, James. 2002. Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pack, Spencer J. 1995. Theological (and hence economic) implications of A. Smith’s “The Principles 
which lead and direct Philosophical Enquiries”, History of Political Economy, 27(2), 289-307. DOI: 
10.1215/00182702-27-2-289
62 Cremaschi, S. Iber. hist. econ. thought. 4(1) 2017: 43-62
Pack, Spencer J. 1996. Adam Smith’s invisible/visible hand/chain/chaos. In L.S. Moss (ed.), Joseph A. 
Schumpeter Historian of Economics. New York: Routledge. 
Pack, Spencer J. and Schliesser, Eric. 2006. Smith’s Humean criticism of Hume’s account of the origin of 
justice, Journal of the History of Political Economy, 44(1), pp. 47-63. DOI: 10.1353/hph.2006.0004.
Raphael, David D. 1977. “The true old Humean philosophy’ and its influence on Adam Smith, in G.P. Morice (ed.), 
David Hume: Bicentenary Papers. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 232-241.
Rothschild, Emma. 2002. Economic Sentiments, Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment. 
Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press.
Samuels, Warren J. 2011. Erasing the Invisible Hand: Essays on an Elusive and Misused Concept in 
Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1948. Economics: an introductory Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of. [1708] 1999. Letter Concerning Enthusiasm. In Characteristics, 
vol. 1, ed. by Ph. Ayres. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 5-34.
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper Earl of. [1709] 1999. Treatise II, viz. Sensus Communis, an essay on 
the freedom of wit and humour. In Characteristics, vol. 1, ed. by Ph. Ayres. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 35-82.
Skinner, Quentin. 2002. Hobbes and the classical theory of laughter. In Visions of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, vol. 1, pp. 142-176.
Smith A. 1774. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, or, An essay towards an analysis of the principles 
by which men naturally judge concerning the conduct and character, first of their neighbours, and 
afterwards of themselves. London: Strahan.
Smith, Adam. [1755-56] 1980. Review of Johnson’s Dictionary. In Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. by 
W.P.D. Wightman, J.C. Bryce and I.S. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 232-241.
Smith, Adam. [1759] 1976. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by A.L. Macfie and D.D. Raphael. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Smith, Adam. [1776] 1976. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 2 vols. ed. by 
R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Adam. [1795] 1980. The Principles which lead and direct philosophical enquires. In Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects, ed. by W.P.D. Wightman, J.C. Bryce and I.S. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 31-105.
Smith, Adam. 1978. Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. by R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael and P.G. Stein. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Smith, Adam. 1983. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. by J.C. Bryce. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.
Smith, Adam. 1987. Correspondence, ed. by E. Campbell Mossner and I.S. Ross Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Smith, Craig. 2009. The Scottish Enlightenment, unintended consequences, and the science of man, The 
Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7(1), 9-28. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/E1479665108000304.
Smith, Craig. 2009. The Scottish Enlightenment, unintended consequences and the science of man, The 
Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 7(1), 9-28. DOI: 10.3366/E1479665108000304.
Vivenza, G. 1999a. Adam Smith e la filosofia scettica, Nuova economia e storia 5(3), 185-202.
Vivenza, G. 1999b. Ancora sullo stoicismo di Adam Smith, Studi storici Luigi Simeoni, 99, 97-126.
Vivenza, G. 2008. A Note on Adam Smith’s First Invisible Hand, Adam Smith Review, 4, 26-29. DOI: 
10.4324/9780203888384.ch3.
Vivenza, Gloria. 2001. Adam Smith and the Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vogel Carey, Toni. 2016. Adam Smith’s invisible hand: A brief history. Adam Smith Review, 9, 88-104.
Weinrich, Heinrich. 1976. Ironie, in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie, vol. 4. Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe Verlag, pp. 577-582.
Whately, Richard. 1832. Introductory Lectures on Political Economy, 2nd ed. enlarged. London: Parker. 
Wightman, W.P. 1975. Adam Smith and the history of ideas, in A.S. Skinner and Th. Wilson (eds.) Essays 
on Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 44-67.
